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Bringing Balance to the Force:
The Militarization of America’s Police
Force and its Consequences
ANTA PLOWDEN*
The current trend in the militarization of police can be
traced back to the earliest times in our country. We are soon
approaching a tipping point in which the combination of aggressive military tactics, wrongful deaths and injuries, and
a lack of accountability will lead to an increase in civil unrest and animosity towards those who have sworn to uphold
the law. In an ironic twist of fate, the military force, which
law enforcement is trying to emulate, has made sharp adjustments in the way it operates due to the missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It has adopted more police-like behavior
in order to afford civilians the protections that, in many
cases, are not given to American citizens.
This Comment will discuss the history of American policing and how it gradually became more militarized. It will
then discuss the consequences of this hyper-militarization
and how it affects not only civilians, but officers as well.
Then the focus will shift to the problems with the military
being used to handle domestic disturbances and how the military has adapted to its new role in a post-9/11 world. Finally, it will make recommendations to restore trust in the
police force and allow them to safely and effectively accomplish their mission of upholding the law.

*
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and Pilot in the United States Air Force. I would like to thank my family, friends,
members of the University of Miami Law Review, and the University of Miami
School of Law. I would especially like to thank Major Ryan Scott David, a friend,
airman, and brother in arms. Without his sacrifice, I would have never had the
courage to take the next step and follow my dreams. Rest in Peace Brother.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a 7-year-old girl sleeping on a couch with your
grandmother. All of a sudden, a flash-bang grenade wakes you from
your sleep and a group of armed men kick in your front door. In the
middle of all of the confusion, a shot rings out, you feel a sharp pain
and look down, and you begin to see red seep through your favorite
pajamas. What if those armed men were actually a police special
response team executing a midnight raid on a home that would be
part of a reality television show? This story may sound outlandish,
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but this is exactly what happened to 7-year-old Aiyana StanleyJones in Detroit, Michigan, in May of 2010.1
Imagine now that you are a 12-year-old boy, playing in a park
with your toy gun. After taking out all of the imaginary bad guys,
you put your toy gun in your waistband and take a seat at a nearby
table. All of a sudden a car drives off of the street, across the park
and comes to a screeching halt right in front of you. Two men exit
the vehicle and yell something at you that you cannot quite make
out. Before you can respond, a shot rings out, you feel a sharp pain
and look down and you begin to see red seep through your favorite
jacket. What if those two men in the car were police officers that
were asked to investigate a suspicious character who may have a
gun? This is not another outlandish story, this is what happened to
12-year-old Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio, in November of 2014.2
How is it that America’s police force has shot and killed more people in March of 2015 than the United Kingdom did in the entire 20th
century?3
In the town of Keene, New Hampshire, a town that has only seen
two murders between 2009 and 2014, local police have acquired a
Ballistic Engineered Armored Response Counter Attack Truck
(“BearCat”) from the Department of Defense.4 In Columbia, South
Carolina, local police were able to obtain a Mine-Resistant Ambush
Protected Vehicle (“MRAP”) from the Department of Defense in
order to protect the city streets.5 How does equipment suited for the
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan end up on Main Street? What
1
See Kate Abbey-Lambertz, How A Police Officer Shot A Sleeping 7-YearOld To Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2014, 5:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/17/aiyana-stanley-jones-joseph-weekley-trial_n_5824684.
html (last updated Oct. 2, 2014).
2
See Sean Flynn, The Tamir Rice Story: How to Make a Police Shooting
Disappear, GQ (July 14, 2016, 6:01 AM), http://www.gq.com/story/tamir-ricestory.
3
See Matt Agorist, American Cops Just Killed More People in March than
the UK Did in the Entire 20th Century, FREE THOUGHT PROJECT (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://thefreethoughtproject.com/american-cops-killed-people-month-march-ukentire-20th-century/.
4
Aaron Cantú, 4 shocking examples of police militarization in America’s
small towns, SALON (Mar. 28, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/2
8/4_shocking_examples_of_police_militarization_in_americas_small_towns_
partner/.
5
Id.
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happens when you place military-grade weapons designed to kill in
the hands of those who are meant to serve and protect? What happens when keeping the peace becomes a war on the streets? What
happens when the civilian is viewed as the enemy combatant?
This Comment will look at the history of America’s police force
and its gradual militarization. It will then analyze the effects of the
militarization of America’s police force and show how, in many
ways, police have become more aggressive than actual military
forces fighting in a warzone. Next, this Comment will explore the
sordid history of the military’s interaction with civilian protestors.
It will analyze the changes the military has made to deal with the
changing battlefield and show that, ironically, the military is becoming more like a police force. Finally, it will look at the training police
receive and make recommendations for changes to training that will
help restore balance to the police force.
I. A LONG TIME AGO IN A GALAXY NOT SO FAR AWAY: COLONIAL
POLICING AND THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN POLICE FORCE
In order to understand how we reached a point where tanks are
needed to patrol city streets, we must look at the history of how police have operated in America. Radley Balko notes in Rise of the
Warrior Cop that sheriffs and constables in late eighteenth century
colonial America served more of an administrative role, and it was
up to the communities to deal with transgressors.6 As the country
grew, law enforcement developed differently by region.7 In the
Northeast, as towns became larger and more diverse, paid night patrols were organized to handle petty crimes, but were unable to handle some of the more violent and organized crime.8 In the South, the
“slave patrol” became the standard.9 In the Western frontier, law enforcement was often accomplished by vigilante groups who would

6
RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES 27–28 (2013) (stating that in the precolonial era,
crime was synonymous with sin and enforcement was determined by the prevailing traditions and religion of the community).
7
See id. at 28.
8
See id.
9
See id. Because of the homogenous nature of the citizens of the South and
the fear of slave revolts, these patrols most closely resemble modern police. See
id. They were armed, uniformed, and authorized to arrest, search, and detain
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fill the void left by a lack of organized law enforcement and oftentimes would be no better than the criminals themselves.10
What would become the “modern police force” did not arrive in
the United States until the mid-1800s with the first department in
New York, followed by Boston and Philadelphia.11 Ironically, at that
time, police feared being thought of as an army so they patrolled
without guns or uniforms.12 Police officers were appointed by local
politicians and required to live in the communities they patrolled.13
Their duties included everything from law enforcement to running
the local soup kitchen.14 But because of the need for political connections to become a police officer and the lack of official training,
law enforcement officers at the time were better known for their incompetence, brutality, and corruption than for their effectiveness in
crime prevention or bringing criminals to justice.15
It was not until the early twentieth century when a series of reforms that focused on “professionalism” took hold and the police
went from an incompetent, corrupt institution to the modern organization focused primarily on crime control that we know today.16
Unfortunately, as the emphasis on professionalism increased, the
connection with the community began to erode.17 As departments
began to eradicate the patronage system of the nineteenth century,
the departments became more isolated and less accountable to the
political leaders and the general public.18 As technological advances
like radios and patrol cars became more available, individual officers had fewer interactions with the public they were sworn to protect
and became, as Balko put it, a “faceless and intimidating presence.”19
slaves. See id. Eventually every colony in the South passed laws legitimizing these
patrols, making them the primary means of law enforcement in the region. See id.
10
See id. at 29.
11
See id. at 30.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See, e.g., id.
15
See id. at 30–31 (noting how elected ward leaders would exert pressure on
police commanders to selectively enforce the law in order to guarantee reelection).
16
See id. at 31–32.
17
See id. at 34.
18
See id.
19
Id.
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A. Crime, Social Unrest, and the Growth of Militarization
Eventually, early police transitioned from an untrained, incompetent force with strong ties to the community that it served, to a
much more professional, albeit isolated, force focused on crime
fighting.20 While that is a brief history of early American policing,
it still does not answer how our police force went from not wanting
to carry firearms in the mid-1800s to today, where departments think
that owning a tank is perfectly reasonable.21 This section will look
at how factors such as increased criminal violence, social unrest, illegal drugs, politics, and terrorism have changed the way modern
police interact with civilians in the twenty-first century.
Early policing, while effective in most situations, always seemed
to have trouble when dealing with more violent and organized
crime.22 One of the earliest examples of police militarization stems
from the passage of the Volstead Act in 1919, better known as Prohibition.23 The passage of this law led to an increase in criminal violence as gangs and bootleggers began to arm themselves with deadlier weapons.24 In response, law enforcement also felt the need increase that fire power, and the ensuing arms race led to heavily
armed police forces.25 But it was not until 1965 that police took the
first major step towards militarization.26
In the summer of 1965, what started out as a perfectly normal
“Driving Under the Influence” stop erupted into one of the worst
riots in American history.27 In the midst of racial tension between
the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) and local minority
communities, Officer Lee Minkus attempted to arrest Marquette
Frye for suspicion of driving while intoxicated and driving without
a license.28 Things quickly escalated when Frye’s family arrived at

20

See id. at 31–32, 34.
See id. at 30. See also Cantú, supra note 4.
22
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 28.
23
See, e.g., id. at 32–33; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1.
24
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 32–33.
25
Id. at 33.
26
See id. at 53.
27
See id. at 51; see also DARYL F. GATES, CHIEF: MY LIFE IN THE L.A.P.D.
88–104 (1992) (providing a description of the Watts narrative and events leading
up to the riots).
28
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 51.
21
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the scene and a physical altercation with the police occurred. 29 The
ensuing arrests led to what is known as the Watts Riots, and in the
six days following the arrest, those riots cost the city of Los Angeles
over $40 million and left more than 1,000 people injured and thirtyfour dead.30 It was riots like the Watts Riots and those that followed
in Detroit, Baltimore, and Newark that shocked Middle America.31
The images of such violence and lawlessness instilled a fear that
would later be used to usher in new policies that gave police more
power, authority, and permission to use force.32
On the ground, police dealing with the riots felt completely overwhelmed.33 Rioters were taking up sniper positions in buildings, using Molotov cocktails, and applying guerilla tactics.34 Noting the
similarity to the tactics used by the enemy combatants in Vietnam,
the chief of the Los Angeles police force, Daryl Gates, looked to the
military for help.35 The training and tactics he learned would lead to
the development of America’s first Special Weapons and Tactics
(“SWAT”) team.36
While the riots may have made big cities seem dangerous to the
average American, it did not take long before those living in suburbs
began to feel threatened. In August of 1966, in an all too familiar
scenario, a lone gunman barricaded himself in a clock tower and
opened fire on students and civilians on the campus of the University of Texas at Austin.37 Armed with multiple rifles, handguns, and
a shotgun, Charles Whitman was able to take the lives of thirteen
people and wound over thirty more.38 Police were again left out-

29

Id.
Id. at 52.
31
Id. at 53.
32
Id.
33
See GATES, supra note 27, at 107–14 (discussing how Gates’ experience in
Watts led to him becoming an expert in dealing with riots. This is turn led to the
study of anti-guerilla tactics from the military, and the formation of an anti-sniper
team which would eventually be known as SWAT.).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 53.
37
See id. at 56–57.
38
Id. at 57. Oddly enough, after Whitman was killed, he left a note asking for
doctors to study his brain to see if they can find out where his overly aggressive
behavior came from. See id. at 58. Doctors found that he had developed a brain
30
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gunned and unable to respond to the threat, thus reinforcing the desire of citizens and police forces to have specialized units to deal
with these kinds of situations.39 It was events like these that brought
the fear of crime home to the American population; violent crime
was no longer an inner city issue, but instead could happen to anyone, anywhere, at any time.
It was this sentiment that led to the general acceptance of these
SWAT teams by police forces around the country. 40 Police forces
began actively training with the military and stockpiling arms, such
as helicopters, sniper rifles, and armored vehicles.41 This was not
met without resistance; in fact, many people argued that the police
were supposed to be a civil force, pointing to the Third Amendment
to support the claim that military-style policing violated the Amendment’s intent.42 In the end, the general sense of increased crime and
chaos allowed for the acceptance of this more aggressive type of
policing.43 While the riots and threats of lawlessness grew remote as
time passed, the militaristic nature of the police force persisted.44
B. Policing and the War on Drugs
In June 1971, President Nixon declared a “war on drugs.”45 The
idea was that by using the metaphor of war, it would galvanize the
public into action to address this social problem.46 In order to gain
public support, Nixon and his crime team launched a public relations
campaign to scare the public about crime by tying crime to heroin.47
This campaign included everything from planting media stories, to
tumor that affected his amygdala, the part of the brain responsible for fear and
anger. See id. at 58.
39
See id. at 57.
40
Id. at 63.
41
Id.
42
GATES, supra note 27, at 115 (noting that even police leadership initially
disapproved of SWAT’s quasi-militaristic tactics). See also U.S. CONST. amend.
III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.”).
43
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 64.
44
Id.
45
American Judicature Society, It is time to end the war on drugs, 93
JUDICATURE 1 (2009) [hereinafter Judicature].
46
See id.
47
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 103–104.
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recalling ambassadors from countries known to produce heroin, to
holding high-level strategy sessions for the media to attend.48 Nixon
even went so far as to declare narcotics to be “public enemy number
one in the United States.”49 With the success of this campaign,
Nixon was able to pass a series of crime-related bills that would authorize measures such as preventative detention, extensive wiretapping, and even the “no-knock” raid.50 It was Nixon’s rhetoric that
shaped America’s current drug policy.51
The war on drugs has both a foreign and domestic component.
Military advisors were sent all over Latin America to deal with drug
cartels in places like Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia.52 This even escalated to an all-out invasion of Panama in 1989 to oust General Manuel Antonio Noriega.53 With all this military action occurring on
the foreign front, the question became, “how are the domestic police
holding up their end of the fight?” With the passage of the Military
Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act in 1981,54 soldiers and police not only trained together, but jointly conducted paramilitary operations.55 This included using U2 spy planes to search for drug
fields and conducting helicopter raids on civilians suspected of
growing marijuana—raids that were better suited for the hamlets of
Vietnam than the hills of California.56 In the decades following the
start of the war on drugs, there has been an increase in the routine
use of military tactics when arresting nonviolent offenders, resulting
in (1) dangerous military equipment used in situations where it is
not needed; (2) “no-knock” raids that not only result in property
48

Id.
Judicature, supra note 45, at 1 (internal quotation marks removed).
50
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 102.
51
See Judicature, supra note 45, at 1.
52
See Harry L. Marsh, Law Enforcement, the Military, and the War on
Drugs: Is the Military Involvement in the War on Drugs Ethical?, 10 AM. J.
POLICE 61, 65 (1991).
53
Id. While the United States justified the invasion as a response to Noriega’s
declaration of war on the United States and the killing of a U.S. military officer,
President Bush did speak of the importance of bringing Noriega to the U.S. to
stand trial for his drug trafficking activities. Id.
54
See generally Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Officials Act
of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-86, § 905, 95 Stat. 1115 (codified as Military Support for
Law Enforcement Agencies, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–83 (1998)).
55
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 147–48.
56
Id.
49
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damage, but also injury and the death of innocent parties; and (3)
challenges to the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the protection it offers citizens.57
While this war does very little with respect to treatment of drug
addiction, it did succeed in overwhelming the prison system, leading
to racial profiling and increasing the polarization of police–community relations—especially among minorities.58 Ironically, the harder
the police cracked down on drug dealers, the more the violence increased.59 As established black markets were upset by crackdowns,
new players would try to fill the void and power struggles would
ensue.60 These turf wars would go on to claim the lives of not only
criminals, but also police and countless civilians.61
By the 1990s, these paramilitary tactics expanded beyond just
drug raids.62 Normal investigations ended up turning into multiday
standoffs, resulting in the wrongful deaths of citizens not involved
in the drug trade.63 Missteps like Ruby Ridge, Waco, and even Cuban immigrant Elián González increasingly caused the public to
start questioning the tactics used by civilian law enforcement.64 That

57

Ronald Goldfarb, Review of Rise of the Warrior Cop: The Militarization of
America’s Police Forces, 28 WASH. LAW. 42, 42–43 (2013) (reviewing BALKO,
supra note 6).
58
See Judicature, supra note 45, at 1 (noting the effects of congressional legislation that resulted in mandatory minimum sentences for crack possession while
those who possessed powder cocaine were often able to avoid prison altogether);
but see Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372
(amending the Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import
and Export Act by reducing the disparity between crack cocaine and power cocaine).
59
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 97 (describing this as a “self-perpetuating,
self-escalating feedback loop created by the modern drug war.”).
60
See id. at 97.
61
Id.
62
See id. at 200.
63
Id.
64
See id. at 200–01 (the Ruby Ridge incident started with the illegal sale of
sawed-off shotguns and ended with the U.S. Marshalls, local police, F.B.I., and
the A.T.F. killing a fourteen-year-old boy, both of his parents, and the family
dog); id. at 201–02 (in Waco, TX, A.T.F. agents conducted an unnecessary sixweek long raid that resulted in the death of seventy-six adults and twenty-six children); id. at 204 (I.N.S. led a SWAT team into a civilian home in order to forcibly
remove González from his relatives and return him to his father in Cuba).
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is, until one of the darkest days in American history, September
11th, 2001.65
C. Policing and the War on Terror
“[E]very American is a soldier, and every citizen is in this fight”
were the words used by President Bush following the attacks on
9/11.66 This threat of terrorism allowed for police departments
across the country to justify requests for bigger arsenals and more
equipment; even small towns needed a SWAT team.67 As American
soldiers geared up to fight terrorism abroad, the constant and ubiquitous threat of another terrorist attack on American soil blurred the
lines between the military and the increasingly militarized domestic
police forces.68 Police departments patrolled the streets in armored
vehicles and increased the frequency of predawn military-style raids
on civilian homes—all in the name of counterterrorism efforts.69
The reorganization of state agencies under the newly-formed
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) gave local police departments access to immense budgets.70 By 2007, “eighty percent of
U.S. towns with a population between twenty-five thousand and
fifty thousand people maintained a SWAT team.”71 Equipment such
as grenade launchers, which in the 1960s required permission from
the Department of Defense to use,72 are today collecting dust in at
65

Cynthia A. Brown, Divided Loyalties: Ethical Challenges for America’s
Law Enforcement in Post 9/11 America, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 651, 658
(2011).
66
Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The President; Bush Announces
a Crackdown on Visa Violators, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/30/us/a-nation-challenged-the-president-bush-announces-acrackdown-on-visa-violators.html (internal quotation marks removed).
67
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 242.
68
See Brown, supra note 65, at 661.
69
See id. at 672–73.
70
Cadman Robb Kiker III, From Mayberry to Ferguson: The Militarization
of American Policing Equipment, Culture, and Mission, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
ONLINE 282, 287–88 (2015).
71
Id. at 288.
72
See, e.g., John Payne, How Police Became a Standing Army, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles
/how-police-became-a-standing-army/ (noting Los Angeles Chief of Police Daryl
Gates asked Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty “to request permission from the Department of Defense to fire a grenade into” the headquarters of the Black Panthers.).
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least two university police departments.73 The “1033 Program,” as
codified in 10 U.S.C. § 2576(a),74 authorized the Secretary of Defense to provide “material support to authorized federal and state
law enforcement agencies by transferring articles suitable for counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.”75 This gave police unprecedented access to military-grade equipment—everything from
computers and first-aid kits to assault rifles and aircraft—to fight a
“war” against American civilians.76 But when police wage “war” on
American soil against American civilians, mistakes are bound to occur.
II. FEAR LEADS TO ANGER, ANGER LEADS TO HATE, HATE LEADS
TO SUFFERING: MILITARIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
There are very few people who would argue that there is never
a need for police to have access to certain military equipment, training, and tactics.77 Situations involving hostages or an active shooter,
such as the University of Texas at Austin incident, are examples of
when a SWAT team may be the best option.78 Unfortunately, these
legitimate uses of SWAT teams are few and far between.79 In 1995,
more than 75% of all SWAT team deployments were to serve drug
warrants.80 In fact, the Saint Louis County, Missouri Police Department stated that it was “their standard procedure to use a SWAT
73

See Tyler Kingkade & Alexandra Svokos, Campus Police Are Stocking Up
On Military-Grade Weapons, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2015, 5:47 PM), http:
//www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/15/campus-police-weapons_n_5823310.h
tml (noting that at least sixty-three college campuses have obtained M-16s, fourteen received M-14s, and at least six campuses have mine resistant vehicles provided by the Department of Defense).
74
See generally 10 U.S.C. § 2576(a) (2012); see also Nathan James & Daniel
H. Else, The “Militarization” of Law Enforcement and the Department of Defense’s “1033 Program”, CRS INSIGHTS (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp
/crs/natsec/IN10138.pdf.
75
See James & Else, supra note 74.
76
Id.
77
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 230.
78
See id. at 56–58.
79
See Kiker, supra note 70, at 289 (citing an ACLU report that states that
SWAT teams were deployed for active shooter or hostage situations only seven
percent of the time).
80
BALKO, supra note 6, at 175. At that time over 45% of all SWAT teams
trained with active-duty military personnel. See id.
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team to serve any felony warrant.”81 Often times, SWAT deployments such as these end with disastrous results.82
A. The Civilian Casualties
In 1971, based on a tip that they would find a multimillion-dollar
Phencyclidine (“PCP”) lab, local police and federal law enforcement officials conducted a raid on the Dickerson Ranch.83 The only
problem was that Dirk Dickerson and his girlfriend, Judy Arnold,
were not drug kingpins; instead, they were hippies making a living
off woodworking and carpentry.84 Nineteen law enforcement officials conducted this raid using helicopters and assault rifles.85 Sadly,
when Dickerson attempted to run from these unknown attackers, he
was shot and killed.86 Dickerson was unarmed, but the officer who
shot him thought Dickerson shot another law enforcement official
who actually tripped getting out of the helicopter.87
Again in 1985, when the LAPD first attempted to deploy an armored vehicle modified with a battering ram to aid in a raid on a
suspected crack house, the results were less than stellar.88 The
founder of the SWAT team, Gates, ordered the vehicle to ram a hole
in the side of the target home.89 After destroying the side of the
house, the only thing they found were two women and three children
eating ice cream.90 To add insult to the damage, when the armored
vehicle was backing out of the driveway, it lost control on a patch
of ice and hit a parked car.91

81

Kiker, supra note 70, at 289.
See, e.g., id. at 290–91.
83
See BALKO, supra note 6, at 107.
84
Id.
85
See id. at 107–08.
86
See id. at 111. Judy Anderson would later report that the officers did not
identify themselves as law enforcement until well after Dickerson was shot and
she was being transported from the scene. Id.
87
Id. at 113. When asked why they did not try to shoot the fleeing victim in
the arm or leg, federal agent Ed McReedy replied, “[t]he idea of shooting to
wound is bush league.” Id. (internal quotation marks removed).
88
See id. at 155.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
82

294

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:281

Courts have recently begun to notice the misuse of SWAT
teams.92 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
initially ruled in Berry v. Leslie that police using SWAT tactics to
perform a regulatory raid on a barber shop violated the Fourth
Amendment.93 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit allowed a civil rights claim to continue based on a Louisiana Police SWAT raid of a nightclub performed under the guise
of a regulatory inspection.94 On the other hand, in some jurisdictions, justice may be harder to find.95 The SWAT team that raided
the wrong house and shot and killed 7-year-old Aiyana StanleyJones was cleared of any wrongdoing.96 The prosecutor dropped the
charges, with the sole explanation being that his decision was in the
“best interests of justice.”97 A SWAT team member in Georgia was
also cleared of any wrongdoing after executing a “no-knock” warrant in which the team threw a flash bang grenade into a home,
where it landed and exploded inside of a baby’s crib with the baby
inside.98
B. The Officer Casualties
While officer safety is often given as a reason to justify the use
of such tactics, the officers themselves are not always immune from
the consequences of their overly aggressive actions. In Ker v. State
of California, Justice Brennan’s dissent cited the English common
law tradition of the “Castle Doctrine.”99 He noted a case in which a
defendant, charged with killing an officer of the crown, was acquit-
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ted because the officer, who failed to announce himself while attempting to serve a warrant, was mistaken for an intruder.100 This
opinion showed a particularly keen sense of foresight—predicting
both the rash of wrong home raids and the ensuing officer casualties
inflicted by civilians who thought they were defending themselves
from criminal intruders.101
The dangers of such raids can be seen in places like Texas, where
an early morning “no-knock” raid resulted in the death of one officer
and the wounding of another when the suspect opened fire on police
who he believed were intruders.102 While the police were given information that the home was used to distribute drugs, evidence subsequently gathered at the scene showed no actual drugs were present
on the premises.103 A Texas grand jury later refused to indict the
suspect, accepting that he did in fact believe the police were criminals trying to break into his home.104 In Maryland, a police officer
was shot by a fellow officer while setting up a hydraulic ram in preparation for a “no-knock” entry.105 The suspect surprised the officers
when he unknowingly opened the front door; officers immediately
opened fire, shooting the suspect in the face and fellow officer Patrick Murphy—who was crouched in the doorway setting up the
ram—in the back of the head.106 These are not isolated incidents;
police officers have been killed during pre-dawn, “no-knock” raids
in New York, Florida, and California as well.107 Even on the occasions when evidence of a crime is actually found, the evidence rarely
justifies the amount of force used to obtain it.108
In the age of cell phones and video recordings, police also have
to worry about another issue: retaliation. The recent shootings of
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Alton Sterling109 and Philando Castile110 by police officers and the
accompanying videos have angered minority communities nationwide and caused horrific incidents. In July 2016, Micah Johnson
gunned down five Dallas police officers, claiming it was in retaliation to the recent police shootings of both Sterling and Castile.111
Later that month, Gavin Long took the life of three more police officers after voicing his frustration over the death of Sterling and Castile.112 These retaliatory actions stemming from frustration over police shootings reinforces the “us-versus-them” mentality.113
C. The “Us-versus-Them” Mentality and the Lack of
Accountability
The job of a modern police officer is not easy. On the one hand,
police officers are tasked with protecting civilians and upholding the
law; on the other, they are tasked with fighting a war. Be it a war on
crime, drugs, or even terror, the rhetoric of war can affect the way
law enforcement officials choose to protect civilians.114 They must
choose between upholding the Constitution—which guarantees certain rights to civilians—and answering the call to war.115 The idea
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of the officers fighting a “just war” makes the transition from “Officer Friendly” to “Officer Rambo” not only possible, but much
more likely.116 This can be seen in how the priorities of certain departments or SWAT teams shift from protecting the innocent to
catching the criminal.117 In Waco, Texas, authorities could have easily captured David Koresh on his daily jog and avoided any unnecessary casualties.118 Instead, they planned for an attack on a heavilyfortified compound and conducted a six-week siege that ended with
the death of more than seventy-five people.119
From an early point in their careers, law enforcement officers
are taught an “Us-versus-Them” mentality.120 They are taught that
everyone is a suspect and just about anyone can kill you within a
moment’s notice.121 While there may be some truth to this theory,
often times it can lead to mistakes with disastrous consequences.122
For example, in September 2014, Levar Edward Jones was
stopped by South Carolina state trooper Sean Groubert for a seatbelt
violation. 123 When Groubert asked for Jones’ license, Jones reached
into his vehicle to retrieve it.124 It was at this point, under the impression that Jones was reaching for a weapon, that the trooper
opened fire.125 Luckily for Jones, not only did he survive the incident, but it was captured on video on the trooper’s dash cam.126 The
same cannot be said for Philando Castile, whose death was livestreamed over the internet when he was fatally shot by police while
allegedly reaching for his identification card during a traffic stop.127
Then there was Johnathan Ferrell, a young man who was shot ten
116
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times by a North Carolina police officer after he was looking for
help following a car accident.128 The officer, of course, claimed selfdefense.129 Deven Guilford, a 17-year-old, was shot seven times by
a Michigan police officer following an altercation that stemmed
from Guilford flashing his high beams at a passing police car because the car’s head lights were blinding oncoming traffic.130 When
the officer stopped Guilford, an argument ensued when Guilford refused to produce his license.131 Guilford was dragged from his car,
thrown to the ground, tased, and eventually shot to death.132
While some of these incidents have resulted in criminal charges
against the officer, far too many—including Guilford’s—have resulted in no criminal liability.133 In fact, from 2004 to 2011, of the
2,718 justified homicides by law enforcement, only forty-one officers were charged with either murder or manslaughter.134 As an increasing number of these incidents are captured on video and police
officers fail to be held accountable, the mistrust and fear of police
will only worsen.
III. THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: A HISTORY OF MILITARY POLICE
ACTIONS
Since the birth of this nation, people have always been cautious
about allowing the military to perform police actions.135 The fear
128
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stemmed from British soldiers enforcing the Crown’s laws with little to no accountability.136 The fear was so great that it was even
expressed in the Third Amendment of the Constitution,137 the Insurrection Act,138 and the Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA”).139 As Cynthia
Brown points out:
The objectives of military forces are directed toward
the capture or destruction of assets, and any level of
force necessary to achieve the objectives is authorized. Police, on the other hand, enforce laws and keep
the peace applying the minimal force necessary,
bound by law to ensure civil liberties and protect
life.140
This section argues that, while police forces are becoming more
militaristic, the military has become much more cautious in its application of force and in turn has become much more police-like.
A. Early Days of Military Police Actions
Whenever the military gets involved in civilian matters, the results are often unpredictable.141 Because of the nature of their training, often times the mission objectives come before the rights of civilians.142 For example, in the summer of 1932, American World
War I veterans set up camp outside of the White House. 143 They
were protesting the fact that the government withheld bonuses it
promised to pay them for their service in the war.144 This “Bonus
March” would soon end in tragedy.145 After an altercation with local
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police, President Hoover requested assistance from the Army.146
Two regiments under the command of General Douglas MacArthur,
Major George S. Patton, and Major Dwight Eisenhower proceeded
to attack their fellow veterans with tanks, tear gas, and bayonets.147
As the protesters scattered and Hoover ordered a retreat, MacArthur
refused to stand down and chased the protesters back to their camp
and burned it to the ground.148 At a later press conference, MacArthur showed no remorse, referring to the protestors as a “mob” and
explaining that his actions prevented an insurrection.149
In 1935, the U.S. Army made its Basic Field Manual available
to the public.150 In the section dealing with handling domestic disturbances, it recommended such tactics as firing into the crowd rather than over their heads, and even included instructions on how to
effectively use chemical warfare, artillery, machine guns, mortars,
grenades, tanks, and planes against civilians.151 Other manuals referred to democracy with contempt, relating it to “demagogism” and
“anarchy.”152 The Army published what amounted to an instruction
manual on how to wage war against America.153 What is more
shocking are the views of General Patton, arguably one of America’s greatest war heroes.154 Not only did he think that habeas corpus
was a hindrance, he recommended shooting captured rioters instead
of turning them over to police for fear that they may be released on
a technicality.155 He wrote: “If it is necessary to use machine guns,
aim at their feet. If you must fire, DO A GOOD JOB. A few casualties become martyrs; a large number become an object lesson.”156
However, the use of the military to enforce domestic laws has
not always resulted in tragedy. Following the 1954 Supreme Court
146
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decision in Brown v. Board of Education, public schools were ordered to be integrated.157 When it came time to integrate Central
High School in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, then-Governor Orval
Faubus vehemently objected.158 He went so far as to mobilize the
National Guard to prevent the first African-American students from
entering the school.159 President Dwight Eisenhower refused to send
federal troops at first, perhaps as a result of the “Bonus March” and
the fear of what military troops might do to the protestors.160 Instead,
he met with Faubus face-to-face and tried to convince the governor
to comply.161 After several failed attempts, President Eisenhower
mobilized the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division and simultaneously federalized the Arkansas National Guard.162 By the end of
September 1957, the so-called “Little Rock Nine” entered Central
High School as the first African-American students to attend the
prestigious institution.163 The military units remained until the end
of the school year to protect those students.164
While the military’s actions following Brown v. Board of Education could be viewed as a bright spot in military–civilian interactions, military confrontations with protestors are typically more
tragic. On April 30th, 1970, amid promises to end the Vietnam War,
President Nixon announced that he would be invading Cambodia,
thus expanding the war.165 Protest immediately sprung up on campuses across the country.166
Following a violent confrontation between protestors and local
police on May 1st, Kent, Ohio Mayor Leroy Satrom and Governor
James Rhodes activated the Ohio National Guard.167 By May 4th,
157
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3,000 demonstrators were face-to-face with 100 armed Ohio National Guard members.168 When the order came down to disperse the
crowd, the soldiers readied their weapons and fired tear gas into the
crowd.169 The soldiers advanced to disperse the crowd and for some
reason, as they were returning to the main protest area, almost thirty
of the soldiers began to fire their weapons into the crowd.170 At the
end of the day, four Kent State University students were killed and
another nine students were injured.171 The soldiers claimed self-defense and that the demonstrators were advancing on their position,
but all of the victims were shot at distances between sixty and 750
feet away.172
B. Military Policing in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Principle of
Distinction
There is an old adage that “all is fair in love and war.”173 While
that may be true for love, war has rules. The International Law of
Armed Conflict (“LOAC”) and the Geneva Conventions are just a
few laws that regulate how militaries are allowed to conduct war.174
While it is incumbent on the soldier to avoid unnecessary civilian
casualties, enemy combatants must make an effort to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population.175 In a traditional war, that
is normally the case; opposing sides wearing different uniforms
fighting force on force in open fields.176 Unfortunately, that is not
168
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how the enemy combatants in modern warfare—as seen in Iraq and
Afghanistan—have chosen to fight.177 All too often, they attack
from apartment buildings, mosques, or crowded markets, sometimes
with firearms, sometimes with improvised explosive devices
(“IEDs”), and even the occasional suicide attack.178 With the military under heightened scrutiny for its use of force on civilians, and
soldiers increasingly tasked with policing duties, the United States
has had to change its strategy for fighting these wars.179
Once major combat operations in Baghdad, Iraq ended in May
of 2003, the U.S. military found itself in the difficult position of being in an area still hostile to occupying forces but tasked with performing normal policing duties.180 Fred Abrahams argues that being
in such a situation does not absolve the military from using force in
a restrained, proportionate, and discriminate matter, and most importantly, only when strictly required.181 Unfortunately, this was not
always the case, especially in early 2003.182 Abrahams writes about
the three categories of excessive violence that occurred in Baghdad:
(1) military raids; (2) soldiers responding indiscriminately when under attack; and (3) killing at checkpoints for failure to stop.183
Soldiers would conduct raids on homes looking for weapons or
members of armed groups, similar to the “no-knock” raids performed by American police forces.184 Often times, when the soldiers
encountered armed resistance from civilians who thought they were
acting in self-defense, the soldiers would react by not only killing
the family members, but also sometimes neighbors or random passers-by who would get caught in the crossfire.185 Soldiers would
sometimes come under direct attack while out on patrol, usually
starting with an IED attack.186 While the actual threat was real, soldiers often responded by firing their weapons without identifying
177
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the enemy position and risking the lives of nearby civilians. 187 At
military checkpoints, drivers were often confused by conflicting instructions and the existing language barrier, resulting in the possibility of being shot.188
At this point, the similarities between police tactics and those of
the military should be clear. The 7-year-old who died in a “noknock” raid in Detroit189 could have easily been in Baghdad. Indiscriminate firing of a weapon when you believe you are being attacked sounds very similar to when Dirk Dickerson was shot during
the botched drug raid.190 We should not forget Mr. Jones, who was
shot multiple times while attempting to comply with the police officer’s confusing order.191
Back in Baghdad, leadership began to realize what the problem
was.192 Not only did troops fail to receive adequate training on civilian policing, they lacked proper support, equipment, and translators to communicate with the civilians.193 As one soldier put it, he
was being “asked to go from killing the enemy to protecting and
interacting, and back to killing again.”194 In order to deal with this
new environment, special instructors were brought in to help them
more quickly adapt to the ever-changing battlefront.195 Forces focused on wining the “hearts and minds” of the Iraqi civilians by focusing on their safety and protection from insurgents instead of
solely the soldiers’ personal safety.196 Iraqi police began to accompany soldiers on raids and conduct raids themselves while policing
duties were slowly handed off to Iraqi forces.197
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While there were many civilian casualties in Iraq, the problems
in Afghanistan were far worse.198 The nature of the Taliban fighters
made it difficult to distinguish them from normal civilians.199 In fact,
it was part of their strategy to attack from civilian locations in hopes
that coalition forces would either not return fire or return fire and
risk killing innocent civilians.200 In order to combat this problem,
special Rules of Engagement were developed for Afghanistan.201
These rules focused on proving “hostile act” and “hostile intent” in
order to identify enemy combatants.202 While the definition of “hostile act” is straightforward,203 “hostile intent” required some manifestation of evidence that the suspected enemy combatant was preparing for an attack, such as maneuvering a weapon into launch position, or preparing to lay mines.204 Even attacking in self-defense
needed a showing of either a hostile act or intent as opposed to a
subjective belief.205
IV. A NEW HOPE: HOW TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF
MILITARIZATION AND RESTORE TRUST IN THE POLICE
“The first step in solving a problem is to recognize that it does
exist.”206 Between 2003 and 2013, British officers fired their guns
fifty-one times; in a ten-year period, Canada had only twelve fatal
police shootings; and Japan has not had a police shooting since
2012.207 In contrast, from January to July of 2015, there were more
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than 400 fatalities caused by police gunshots in the United States.208
In 2013, the violent crime rate dropped to its lowest point since
1978; however, in 2013, police killed 461 felony suspects—the
highest total in twenty years.209 There should be no reason that
American police kill more civilians in one month than an entire
country does in 100 years.210 Thus, in order to address this problem,
the focus should be on initial police screening and training, demilitarization of police forces, and accountability.
A. Police Training
Officer Timothy Loehmann, the police officer who shot 12-yearold Tamir Rice, resigned from a previous job as a police officer
when he was found “emotionally unstable and unfit for duty, especially in his handling of firearms.”211 When Officer David Eric
Casebolt assaulted a young girl outside of a pool party in Texas, his
justification for his actions was that he was addressing two previous
calls that day and the stress caused “his emotions to get the better of
him.”212 While being a police officer is a stressful and dangerous job
that can negatively affect the individual, having someone with
known emotional problems or an inability to handle stressful situations while on duty is just a disaster waiting to happen.
On the training front, there needs to be an end to the “Us-versusThem” mentality. Such a philosophy is one that is instilled in young
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police officers as early as the police academy.213 That philosophy
only leads to a lack of trust between civilians and police.214 Furthermore, a greater emphasis should be placed on de-escalation training.215 The aggressive policing tactics of making arrests and issuing
citations for minor infractions runs countercurrent to the concurrent
goals of arresting major criminals and fostering trust within the community.216 Police academy training can vary by state, with hours of
training ranging from 120 hours to nearly 1,000 hours.217 On average, police receive far less training in de-escalation than they do in
handling firearms and defensive training.218
When it comes to weapon training, the focus should be placed
on non-lethal weapons, such as batons and Tasers, as opposed to
firearms. In Oklahoma, a reserve deputy shot and killed—by accident—a suspect who was handcuffed and on the ground.219 The deputy claimed in defense that he was trying to reach for his stun gun
instead of his handgun and was confused in the moment.220 One cannot help but think that if he were more familiar with his stun gun
instead of his handgun, the suspect would still be alive.
B. Demilitarization
Another step in restoring relations between police and the community is to demilitarize the police force. Armored vehicles, grenade launchers, and heavily armed SWAT teams are not needed in
every city. The data speaks clearly to the fact that a vast majority of
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SWAT deployments are not for riot control or active shooter situations, but rather to serve warrants.221 This has become so apparent
that in Arkansas, a SWAT team was activated to patrol a small town
and ask people for identification; refusal to show a form of identification potentially resulted with a charge of obstruction.222
In the 1970s, bucking the trend of militarization, the head of the
D.C. Metro Police, Jerry Wilson, decided to focus on community
engagement instead of aggressive policing.223 Wilson used technology to increase response time to civilian complaints, not to increase
firepower.224 He refused to use “no-knock” raids and looked to hire
police officers from within the community.225 As a result, the crime
rate in D.C. dropped significantly as the national crime rate continued to increase.226
After a series of botched raids and questionable shootings by police, city officials in San Diego completely revamped their police
operations to address the rising discontent in the community.227
Community leaders opened a hotline for civilians to report police
abuse, kept in close contact with local minority and civil rights leaders, and set up a telethon for community members to have on-air
conversations with them.228 When California erupted in protest after
the Rodney King verdict, San Diego police were dispatched to the
neighborhoods as a show of support, not a show of force.229 Imagine
how differently the recent protests in Ferguson, Missouri230 or Baltimore, Maryland231 would have been if the police were there to support the protests, rather than to stop them.
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C. Accountability
Being able to hold the police accountable for their actions is integral to repairing the lack of trust towards the police. Accountability was one of the main reasons why the Founders wanted a separate
police force instead of the military.232 Proponents of police body
cameras advocate for video technology in order to protect both the
police officer and the civilian from frivolous claims.233 We also need
better, proactive community oversight of police, so as to help curb
police misconduct.234 Finally, if there are charges to be levied
against an officer, a special prosecutor can mitigate the perceived
conflict of interest between the state and local law enforcement.235
Digital videos are commonplace now and there is an increasing
body of data showing evidence of police brutality. 236 After seeing
incidents like those that happened with Eric Garner,237 John Crawford,238 and Walter Scott,239 it is easy to see why the need for an
m/protests-erupt-baltimore-after-mistrial-declared-officer-charged-connection406228.
232
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9e_story.html.
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objective observer is necessary. Body cameras are generally believed to increase oversight, transparency, and community relations.240
Civilian complaints about police misconduct are not always
suited for criminal or civil proceedings.241 There needs to be an investigative body outside of the police department because, in many
cases, internal investigations do not bear any fruit.242 For complaints
of this nature, civilian oversight boards can be the most appropriate
place to hear these complaints.243 Similarly, such an oversight board
can be used to keep tabs on police activity. In Maryland, the legislature passed a bill that required the state police departments to periodically submit a report on the number of times a SWAT team was
deployed and for what reason.244 These measures will add an element of transparency to the system and allow for an adequate place
to voice grievances similar to the strategies applied in San Diego in
the early 1990s.245
Finally, in a case where a police officer is charged with a crime,
the state needs to appoint a special prosecutor. In a normal case,
prosecutors and police officers work together to ensure justice is
achieved.246 Unfortunately, when a prosecutor has to indict a police
officer, there are often accusations of a conflict of interest.247 When
the average indictment rate in federal cases is near 100%, but the
indictment rate of police officers involved in a shooting is closer to
1.5%, the idea that there is a conflict of interest seems highly plausible.248 One suggestion is to create an independent “Special Prosecutor’s Office” within each Office of the Attorney General, with the
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sole mission of investigating police or public official misconduct.249
This would create an extra layer of insulation between the state and
local law enforcement.250 While there is no guarantee that a special
prosecutor will fix the indictment rate, it will at least be a step closer
to removing the taint of prejudice in favor of the officer.251
CONCLUSION
Over the years, civilian law enforcement has experienced a slow
progression towards increased militarization. In an attempt to meet
the national call to arms for wars on crime, drugs, and terror, police
forces have felt obliged to adopt the aggressive tactics of the military
in the daily enforcement of laws.252 With ready access to militarygrade equipment, the need to justify their necessity has led departments to use these weapons of war in the most mundane law enforcement circumstances.253 In doing so, many police departments
have damaged their relationships with the communities they are
sworn to protect, resulting in resentment towards the police.254 In an
interesting juxtaposition, while police departments have found
themselves becoming more militaristic, the military has found itself
acting more as police officers and peacekeepers than soldiers.255
While addressing the issues with the military is outside of the scope
of this Comment, it is interesting to note how quickly soldiers
adapted to their new dual mission as peacekeepers.256 In order for
police to re-adapt to the role they play in society, they must focus on
better training, demilitarization, and accountability for their actions.
Without these steps, the balance to the force will never be restored.
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